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John L. Carey 
TACONIC, CONNECTICUT 
EARLY ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN CPAs 
AND THE SEC* 
Abstract: The recollections of John L. Carey about the policies and politics in 
professional circles during the very important period when the Securities Exchange 
Commission first came into being. Mr. Carey served the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants in various capacities from 1925 to 1969, including 
editor of The Journal of Accountancy and Administrative Vice-president, and re-
ceived the Institute's gold medal for distinguished service to the profession. 
The stock market crash of 1929 ruined many investors, large and 
small. Thousands of people who had bought stocks on margin dur-
ing the "New Era" boom of the late 1920's were completely wiped 
out. Some men who had thought they were wealthy jumped out of 
windows. 
An angry public turned its wrath on the stock exchanges, the in-
vestment bankers, the corporations whose stocks had lost much of 
their value, and to some extent the accountants who had audited the 
financial statements of those corporations. However, the account-
ing profession had a lower profile then than now. Only the more 
knowledgeable observers were aware of the auditors' role, so they 
were not as visible a target as others. This dubious advantage was 
not to last long. 
The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency launched an in-
vestigation of the securities markets, with Ferdinand Pecora, a tough 
lawyer, as committee counsel. The findings were to result in the 
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. 
In 1932 two events fanned the flames. The international empire of 
Kreuger and Toll collapsed when its head, Ivar Kreuger, known as 
the "Swedish match king", committed suicide. It was found that he 
had falsified accounts, forged documents, and concealed misappro-
priation of funds on a massive scale. American investors in his com-
panies lost heavily, and questions were raised about audits of the 
financial statements. American accountants who had any connec-
*Published first as Working Paper No. 33 by The Academy of Accounting His-
torians. 
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tion with Kreuger and Toll subsidiaries were called upon to testify, 
but since the frauds had occurred in Sweden, where no American 
accountants had access to the records, they were not held respon-
sible. However, doubts had been raised about the effectiveness of 
financial reporting and independent audits in general. 
Also in 1932, a book was published which had great impact in 
sophisticated circles, and further encouraged demand for legislation 
regulating the issuance of securities and financial reporting of the 
issuers. This book was The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty, by Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, published under 
the auspices of the Columbia University Council for Research in the 
Social Sciences, acting on behalf of the Social Science Research 
Council of America. So far as I know this was the first scholarly and 
authoritative analysis of the modern corporation in America and its 
relation to stockholders and investors. Its main thrust seems hardly 
novel today, but it was news to many people then: that ownership 
and management were almost completely separated; that manage-
ment almost completely controlled the corporation's affairs; that 
stockholders as a whole had little voice; and that the information 
available to stockholders was often inadequate to permit sound 
judgment of the risks they were assuming. 
This naturally led the authors to discussion of corporate financial 
reports and independent audits. In the preface credit was given to 
Professor William Z. Ripley, "who must be recognized as having 
pioneered this area". Professor Ripley's criticisms of the account-
ing profession in the mid-1920's had been responded to by George 
O. May at the American Institute's 1926 annual meeting. 
In 1932 George O. May had enjoyed some five years of freedom 
from administrative responsibilities as senior partner of Price Water-
house & Co. He was consultant to the Committee on Stock List of 
the New York Stock Exchange, and chairman of the American Insti-
tute of Accountants' Committee on Cooperation With Stock Ex-
changes, which was working with the Exchange on the development 
of new standards of financial reporting. 
Among Mr. May's acquaintances was the brilliant young Columbia 
University law professor, A. A. Berle, co-author of The Modern Cor-
poration and Private Property. Somehow Mr. May must have learned 
that the book was being written, and found opportunity to talk with 
Berle before it was published. While Berle was highly critical of 
current accounting practices, the criticism was somewhat tempered 
by such interpolations as: "Accountants of the highest grade decline 
to certify to such statements . . ." and "Capable accountants of a 
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high degree of integrity will catch these situations as they arise . . ." 
To me these modifications of an otherwise devastating indictment 
were clear evidence of George O. May's diplomatic influence. 
Although Professor Berle seemed to be a somewhat opinionated, 
arrogant young man, his brilliance could not be questioned. A mem-
ber of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "brains trust", Berle was the 
principal author of The Modern Corporation, which later events sug-
gested was almost a blueprint for the Securities Acts. So it was not 
of trifling importance to have him say in the book, "the integrity of 
the accountant and the soundness of his method are the greatest 
single safeguard to the public investor", even though the compli-
ment was diluted by the comment, ". . . The failure of the law to 
recognize accounting standards is probably due to the lack of agree-
ment among accountants... ." 
My own acquaintance with Berle came about in this way. In the 
spring of 1933 the "Truth in Securities Act" became law. Berle's 
book, it could be assumed, had had some influence on the content 
of that law. Berle himself was an advisor to the President. It seemed 
to me that it would be a brilliant stroke of public relations to per-
suade him to speak at the annual meeting of the Institute to be held 
at New Orleans in the fall. I cannot recall clearly whether the idea 
originated with me or not, but I think it did. However, Mr. May could 
have suggested it, and in any event he must have approved it, and 
probably made the first approach to Mr. Berle. 
As secretary of the Institute it fell to me to call on Professor Berle 
and present the formal invitation. He was thin, sharp-featured, un-
smiling and unbending. However, after I made my little speech, al-
luding to the interest in accounting manifested in his book, he 
accepted the invitation to address the Institute's annual meeting. 
I remember expressing the hope that he could take some time off, 
away from all the pressures on him, and enjoy a few days' relaxation 
in the attractive city of New Orleans after the meeting. He put me in 
my place by saying rather frostily that if he had time for a vacation 
he would take his family to some quiet spot without being involved 
in a convention. 
Anyway, I was jubilant at the prospect of having so influential a 
personality address our meeting. His acceptance was highlighted in 
the announcements, and doubtless influenced many members to at-
tend. But I was to experience the first of many disappointments of 
this kind — shortly before the meeting Professor Berle telephoned 
to say that he could not attend in person but would send his paper. 
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I pleaded with him not to disappoint the hundreds of accountants 
who expected to hear him, but he was adamant, and that was that. 
His paper, "Public Interest in Accounting," was read at the meet-
ing by Walter A. Staub of New York. The paper did not evoke much 
applause. It stated that accounting was ceasing to be in any sense 
a private matter; it questioned a number of specific accounting prac-
tices; and it called for the consistent development of accounting 
principles subject to the test of public interest. Then in the paper 
Professor Berle questioned whether such principles could be de-
veloped by accountants alone — whether individual accountants 
could maintain completely impartial minds when under the "instruc-
tions" of a client. He predicted that a government bureau would be 
set up to standardize accounting practices in various industries. 
At the meeting Walter Staub was asked to read Berle's paper. 
Having dutifully done so, Mr. Staub opened the discussion by 
strongly challenging the author's assumptions and conclusion. 
Staub, a key partner of Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery was 
an extremely competent and influential man. He was an assid-
uous student of accounting and all that pertained to it. In his re-
marks, he pointed out the failure of government control of the ac-
counting of railroads, utilities and banks. He cited the progress the 
profession had already made, and was making, in cooperation with 
the New York Stock Exchange and bankers, toward elimination of 
accounting practices which Berle had criticized. Then Staub almost 
angrily rejected Berle's patronizing doubts about the independence 
and impartiality of public accountants. 
Mr. Staub's remarks were warmly applauded, and were followed 
by discussion from the floor. The audience sensed that control of 
accounting by government was nearer than ever before. The Securi-
ties Act had become law only a few months earlier. It gave a gov-
ernment agency power to prescribe the form and content of financial 
statements, and the methods to be followed in the preparation of 
accounts. Among those at the New Orleans meeting anxiety was 
mingled with resentment at Berle's too facile criticisms, and Staub's 
strong defense of the profession was a welcome rallying cry. 
Unfortunately, as I thought then and still do, this exchange of 
views had little or no public exposure. So far as I remember, the 
press was either unaware of the incident or paid it little attention. 
Reporters were not in the habit of covering accountants' meetings, 
and the general public showed no interest in accounting at all. It 
was customary to publish in The Journal of Accountancy the papers 
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presented at annual meetings, but in this case the powers that be 
decided not to give Berle's views that much circulation. I ventured 
to suggest that both his paper and Staub's rebuttal be published, but 
to no avail. I was not the editor of The Journal, I had been secretary 
of the Institute for only two or three years, and I had not reached 
my thirtieth birthday, so my judgment on matters of high policy did 
not weigh heavily! What I had dreamed of as a major public-rela-
tions coup turned out, to mix a metaphor, as a lead balloon. 
In January, 1934, only a few months after the meeting at New 
Orleans, the Institute published "Audits of Corporate Accounts," a 
pamphlet containing the historic correspondence between the Insti-
tute committee headed by George O. May and the Committee on 
Stock List of the New York Exchange, staffed by J. M. B. Hoxsey. 
The negotiations leading to this publication had begun in 1930, as 
recounted in the second paper of this series. 
"Audits of Corporate Accounts" clarified the responsibilities of in-
dependent auditors: established the concepts of generally accepted 
accounting principles and consistency in their application from year 
to year; and proposed the first standard form of auditor's report, 
which was immediately adopted and has survived with some 
changes to the present day. 
The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 
The events just described coincided roughly with the enactment 
of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
and the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission to ad-
minister them both. 
The 1933 Act was one of the first major reforms of the "New Deal" 
launched by Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had been inaugurated as 
President only a few months before this law took effect. The findings 
of the so-called Pecora investigation provided background informa-
tion for the legislative draftsmen. 
While the bills were pending before Congressional committee the 
Institute made some recommendations informally "through various 
channels . . . to persons influential in the administration and in Con-
gress." But the only certified public accountant to speak on the pro-
posed legislation was Arthur H. Carter, then president of the New 
York State Society of Certified Public Accountants. He appeared be-
fore the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency to advocate 
inclusion in the new law of a requirement that the accounts of regis-
tered corporations be audited by independent accountants. 
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The fact that he took this step without consultation with the Insti-
tute pointed up some of the flaws in the profession's organizaional 
structure, and in personal relations among some of its prominent 
members. There were two national organizations — the Institute and 
the American Society of Certified Public Accountants, of about equal 
size. Almost as large as each of them was the oldest state society, 
the New York State Society, most of whose members belonged to 
neither national group. Partly because of this, and partly because 
of its position astride the nation's financial center, this state society 
considered itself independently competent to deal with national leg-
islation affecting the profession, as well as local affairs. 
Colonel Arthur H. Carter, then president of the New York State 
Society, encouraged this attitude, partly, perhaps, because he had 
not been made to feel an intimate member of the Institute's inner 
circle. Colonel Carter was a relatively recent arrival among the 
heads of the large accounting firms. He was a West Point graduate, 
formerly a regular army officer, and author of a book on artillery 
tactics which had attracted favorable attention in military circles. 
He married the daughter of Elijah Watt Sells, one of the two founders 
of Haskins & Sells. In 1919, after World War I, Colonel Carter joined 
that firm and passed the CPA examination. In 1930 he became man-
aging partner of Haskins & Sells. 
He was a handsome man, of military bearing, with a flashing smile 
and attractive personality. However, the habit of command appar-
ently kept some colleagues at a distance. John Forbes, who had 
been partner in charge of all Haskins & Sells west coast practice, 
told me that Colonel Carter was a brilliant man, but just didn't under-
stand the partnership relation. Mr. Forbes resigned from Haskins & 
Sells, and then in 1932 became president of the Institute. This may 
not have enhanced the Colonel's affection for the organization. 
Then again, there was some feeling of rivalry between the large 
firms of purely American origin — Haskins & Sells and Lybrand, 
Ross Bros. & Montgomery — and those of British origin, many of 
whose partners in America had come from England and Scotland — 
Price Waterhouse & Co., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., and Barrow, 
Wade, Guthrie & Co., for example. Since George May of Price 
Waterhouse was highly influential in the Institute, Colonel Carter 
may have been moved to demonstrate via his office in the New York 
State Society that native American accountants were capable of 
providing leadership. 
In any case, he testified before the Senate Committee. It was not 
a kindly audience. The questions and comments revealed an aston-
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ishing ignorance on the part of some senators regarding the nature 
of independent audits. One senator seemed to suspect that the wit-
ness was seeking additional employment for certified accountants. 
Questions ranged from how much audits would cost, to why corpo-
ration controllers needed to have their work reviewed, to why the 
government should not perform the audits if they were necessary. 
One senator asked bluntly, "Who audits you?" Colonel Carter's in-
spired reply, "Our conscience," has been quoted more than once. 
In any event the Securities Act of 1933, as enacted, gave the ad-
ministrative agency authority to require independent audits. 
The first reaction was appointment of an Institute committee on 
cooperation with the SEC. This committee, accompanied by the In-
stitute's secretary (me), promptly waited upon Joseph P. Kennedy, 
the Commission's first chairman. Mr. Kennedy was cordial enough. 
He welcomed the offer of cooperation in developing regulations es-
sential to administration of the accounting and auditing provisions 
of the new securities laws. However, he didn't stay on the job very 
long. He was appointed Ambassador to Great Britain, and was suc-
ceeded by James M. Landis, who, if memory serves me right, was a 
former dean of Harvard Law School, briefly a member of the Federal 
Trade Commission (which first administered the 1933 Act), and then 
a member of the SEC. 
Another member of the new SEC was George C. Matthews, who, 
as I recall, had been a member of either the Wisconsin Public Utility 
Commission or the Tax Commission. He knew more about account-
ing, albeit from a specialized, regulatory point of view, than most of 
his colleagues. He was also a reasonable, moderate man, who was 
willing to listen. 
However, Mr. Landis was not so easy to deal with. Cordial and 
conciliatory at first, he became increasingly critical of the account-
ing profession. He was a thin, tense, somewhat impatient man, al-
most humorless, and clearly feeling the pressure of his new respon-
sibilities. 
The Institute Committee on Cooperation With the SEC worked 
very hard. There were many meetings in Washington with staff and 
members of the Commission, most of which I attended. Much of the 
discussion of technical matters was over my head, but it was clear 
that the Institute representatives had a big job of education to do. 
Most of the commissioners and top staff were lawyers or economists, 
with less than a perfect understanding of accounting and auditing. 
In developing policies and regulations covering these areas some 
SEC officials were tempted to write a rule book establishing uniform 
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accounting for corporations subject to their jurisdiction. The Insti-
tute committee kept pointing out the hazards of such an approach. 
The publication in 1934 of "Audits of Corporate Accounts" 
strengthened our committee's contention that the profession could 
do the job of developing accepted accounting principles. 
The commission had soon realized that it needed a full-time senior 
staff assistant who was a qualified professional accountant. By a 
stroke of good fortune Carman G. Blough was appointed to the 
newly created post of Chief Accountant of the SEC. He had served 
in the new Commission as security analyst and as assistant director 
of the registration division. He was a CPA of two states, a former 
member of the Wisconsin State Board of Accountancy, a former ac-
counting professor and head of the accounting department at the 
University of North Dakota, member of the Wisconsin Tax Commis-
sion, and secretary of the Wisconsin State Board of Public Affairs. 
Blough was not only a competent accountant but was temperamen-
tally ideally qualified for the new job. The ablest practitioners who 
dealt with the Commission soon came to respect and like him. Per-
haps more importantly, the commissioners themselves soon came to 
rely on him heavily for decisions on accounting and auditing matters. 
The critical importance of having such a man in the powerful 
office of Chief Accountant of the SEC was soon to be demonstrated. 
Chairman Landis, who always seemed to be harassed, his pa-
tience strained, could blow hot and cold. In January, 1935, speaking 
before the New York State Society, he praised the CPA organiza-
tions for their help and cooperation and invited their criticism and 
questions — "We need you as you need us." In October, 1935, 
speaking before the American Management Association, he referred 
to the accountants in a way that suggested they were helpful col-
laborators. But in December, 1936, in a speech to the Investment 
Bankers Associations, he delivered this wintry blast: 
The impact of almost daily tilts with accountants, some 
of them called leaders in their professions, often leaves little 
doubt that their loyalties to management are stronger than 
their sense of responsibility to the investor... .The choice 
here of more or less regulation is an open one for the pro-
fession. It is a 'Hobson's choice' for government. 
This threat, without prior warning, was a shock. The chairman 
of the Institute Committee on Cooperation With SEC telephoned 
Mr. Landis to express concern. Mr. Landis, tired perhaps, was not 
belligerent. He indicated a desire to be helpful, and suggested con-
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sultation with the Commission's chief accountants The result was an 
arrangement whereby Carman Blough could consult the Institute 
committee on questions involved in disagreements between the 
commission's staff and accounting firms who had signed financial 
statements filed with the SEC. 
This blossomed into almost continuous consultation, including 
frank informal discussions, between Carman and Institute represen-
tatives as well as individual partners of accounting firms. This give 
and take focused on specific cases involving problems of corporate 
financial reporting. Gradually a pragmatic, evolutionary approach to 
development of accounting principles was developing. 
As the Commission's confidence in Carman's competence and 
judgment increased his recommendations became more and more 
influential. The SEC dropped the idea of issuing a rule book, for the 
time being at least, and offered the profession the opportunity to 
take the lead in improving the situation, while reserving the SEC's 
right to exercise its authority whenever it seemed desirable to do so. 
Meanwhile, the profession had made some tentative steps toward 
establishing formal, authoritative guidelines governing corporate 
financial reporting, and the effort was soon to be beefed up sub-
stantially. But that is a subject for another paper. 
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